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Abstract 
    This paper tries to answer the question of what should be the main focuses to 
improve the poverty situation in Sub-Saharan Africa, through a liberal perspective, 
by decomposing the economic development in the region into several principal 
constituents on the domestic level. Emphasis is made on the policy evaluation and 
implications from these constituents, with a special note on the actual institutional 
implementation, where the issues of agency coordination are discussed. A case of 
Tanzania is provided in the appendices in an attempt to better illustrate the 
analytical results. 
JEL: No. O55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
    Following the declaration of the Millennium Development Goals
1
, the poverty goal of 
which calls for reducing by half of the proportion of world population living on less than 
0.5 USD per day, countries have erected ambitious poverty reduction plans to realize this 
grand vision. In the past decade, inspiring achievements have been made worldwide and 
the general trend of economic development seems to have become the theme of the 21st 
century. Countries, especially those in East Asia, have done a tremendous job in poverty 
reduction. China alone, has contributed a relief of 600 million people from poverty 
between 1981 and 2005. However, regional disparity of poverty reduction has been 
enlarged between developing countries. Notably, the poverty rates in some Sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) countries have been persistently above trend throughout the past two 
decades. Under the enormous influence of globalization, the poverty issue in Africa has 
become increasingly aware of and globally addressed. In the literature of theoretical and 
empirical studies of poverty issues in Africa, two fundamental analytic pivots stand out: 
causes of poverty and cures for poverty. Traditionally, related research and debates in the 
academia on this topic have been generally divided into three major IPE perspectives, 
namely, Mercantilism, Liberalism, and Structuralism, with respect to their principal 
analytic angles.  
 
2. Analytic Premise    
    Common views concerning the formulation of poverty in Africa—why Africa is 
poor—usually stem from a Structuralist, or sociological, perspective, highlighting what 
the region has had no control over, e.g. colonialism, instead of focusing on what it may 
control. As early as Lenin‟s Imperialism, the Structuralist perspective has been applicable 
to explaining the depleted situation of the continent, especially the SSA countries, which 
have fell early on to the colonial expansion of European conquerors. Colonialism and the 
                                                          
1
 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight international development goals that 192 United 
Nations member states and at least 23 international organizations have agreed to achieve by the year 
2015. They include reducing extreme poverty, reducing child mortality rates, fighting disease epidemics 
such as AIDS, and developing a global partnership for development. 
triangular trade starting from the 16
th
 century have proved to be a commonly cited reason 
for the present fragility of the region‟s socio-economic stability.2   
    Admittedly, the Structuralist approach has been well accepted and evaluated as a sound 
explanation for the causes of poverty in Africa. However, it should be noted that a major 
deficiency of this approach to the African poverty issue lies in its limited implication that 
the region has always been subjugated to a historically-rooted structure of oppression. 
This implication is at most conclusive but not inducing. Every African country has its 
own set of problems and variables, with a recent history of development that has been far 
from smooth and varied considerably relative to the region as a whole. Note that, 
countries, namely Ethiopia and Liberia, that have never been colonized before are not at 
all out-performing other countries in recent years. As there are heterogeneous factors and 
concrete variables that collectively affect every single country, too general an approach 
of rigid theorization would seem to provide little, if at all, momentum to the normative 
analysis at a pragmatic level for improvement.  
    In this paper, I invoke no debate among theorists on the topic of poverty formulation in 
the region, but rather approach the issue of poverty in Africa, precisely in the SSA 
                                                          
2
 One theory, the “Weapon and skill factors” focuses on the actual material flows of colonialism. While 
India, colonized by the Great Britain, was de facto a beneficiary of the basis for an industrial structure, 
with roads and railways, most Sub-Saharan countries did not benefit from such projects, but instead were 
exploited for their manual labor and raw materials. Although both places were colonies, the inflicted 
treatments did, from this perspective, vary tremendously. Drawing on those observations one quickly 
comes to the conclusion that it has been a lot easier for India to catch up than it had been for countries 
south of the Sahara. Further details have been added to strengthen the view, even stretching to the point 
where the human cruelty of several of the region’s conflicts (Sudan, Rwanda, etc.) was the consequence 
of the slave trade in a hitherto peaceful region void of such horrible acts. Although the basis that the 
Europeans did mostly not bring industrialization to the region is true, and is not an advantage in the early 
21
st
 century, further developments of the theory are void of concrete foundation. 
    A more recent theory, the Modern World System (MWS), portrays another explanation for the region’s 
state. Again, it uses events that the region has no control over to explain its internal state. According to 
the MWS, the world economy, capitalist at heart, “provides the sole means of organization in the 
international system”. The region south of the Sahara has been “out of the loop” of the world economy 
and thus stands at its periphery. Consequently, the region is hopelessly standing by as famine and other 
horrors slowly dash any hopes for it to one day play a role in the global economy that left it aside in the 
first place. It somewhat implies the region could not theoretically be a self-sufficient center, that there is 
only one absolute motor of growth called the “World Economy”. This assumption itself is not infallible, 
but it reflects the fact that there may be little the “peripheral countries” can do to change the unfavorable 
global systems currently---they are still dependent. 
region
3
, where essentially the poverty problem arises, through the lens of a more liberal 
and forward-looking perspective. I motivate the analysis with an attempt to address the 
issue of development, i.e., how the poverty situation can be improved and what might be 
the possible motors for growth. It should be pointed out that the analytic locus of control 
of this paper is the emphasis on searching for a set of liberal constituents, over which 
governments, be them mercantilist or liberal in essence, have control, that can provide a 
basic framework of evaluation and implication in consideration of the common 
development problems in the region.
4
 Liberal constituents as I define here are referred to 
the distinctive aspects of a nation‟s socio-economic development involving markets and 
individuals; liberal policies thus serve as a de-ideologized tool to engineer the nation‟s 
socio-economic environment whenever and wherever they are perceived appropriate. The 
paper posits no assertion of a required adoption of liberal values at the height of states on 
a massive scale,
5
 but will try to prove the appropriateness of liberal policies as defined 
above in the current context of SSA countries. Given the intention of establishing a 
generic model for each country in the region to adapt and apply for policy evaluation and 
implication, I narrow the scope of the paper to an analysis of the principal constituents of 
economic development on a domestic level, addressing issues to which feasible 
implementations of effective measures exist, excluding the international and global 
factors that would otherwise complicate the poverty issue in the region. 
 
3. Methodology 
    Motivated as in the last section, I want to find a set of common factors that can account 
for poverty reduction differences between countries, by which I can construct a 
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 We focus on SSA countries rather than the entire continent also for the sake of comparable analysis of 
the poverty issue, i.e., countries north of Sahara generally have higher standards of living and top the 
continent in terms of GDP per capita and other economic indicators, which would otherwise make the 
comparison biased in nature. 
4
 Here a significant distinction should be made between liberal or mercantilist states and liberal or 
mercantilist policies. 
5
 We do not challenge and it is irrelevant to our analysis to challenge the central debate in economic 
development of nations that whether markets or states triumph one another. After all, a mercantilist 
government can still adopt liberal policies if it is to their favor. It should be clear that it is the alleviation of 
poverty and mass suffering that we are focusing on, without any assumption of the intention of the states. 
benchmark model for the examination of related policies and possible implications for 
future policy directions. A brief literature survey suggests many relevant methods and 
techniques in decomposing the poverty situation in SSA, among which stands the one 
most illuminating to the approach I adopt, i.e. Rodrick et al (Rodrick et al., 2002), in 
which a multiple-regression model of three independent variables, namely, institution, 
geography, and integration/economic openness, has been constructed and tested to pin 
down institution as the most important factor in indicating a country‟s economic 
performance, transcending the influence of geography and market integration. Institution, 
by definition, concerns with administration & legislation and the legal framework within 
which an organization operates (Mule, 2009). It consists of public and private sectors. 
Public institutions include the protection mechanism of property rights, enforcement of 
judicial independence and security, along with deterrence of corruption and government 
inefficiency. Private institutions are more active in economic sector, mainly referring to 
corporate ethics and accountability.
6
 Utilizing a large scale data set collected from 140 
countries worldwide, their regression result on a wide choice of factors including 
institution, market integration and colonial influence has shown a dominant impact of 
institution on living standard improvements over all other factors.
7
 
    Facing the retarded institutional developments in many SSA countries since 1980s, and 
given the above strong message about the role of institution, I wonder if institution status 
can be a strong indicator of SSA countries‟ poverty level by influencing their economic 
development process, as suggested by the world pattern in Rodrick et al (RTS, 2002). To 
test the hypothesis of institutional significance, a multiple-regression analysis is 
performed. I adopt the factor screening mechanism in the previous paper
8
 to complete the 
factor choice with the top three constituents, among those national socio-economic 
indicators published and ranked by the World Economic Forum 2009, as potentially the 
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 Schwab K., 2009, “The Global Competitiveness Report 2009-2010”, pp. 44-45  
7
 According to their research, a unit positive shock to the institutional quality equation ultimately 
produces in log incomes of 2.15, 4.4 times the impact on log income by a positive shock to the trade 
equation.  
8
 This mechanism in the paper is in itself built upon the work of Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 
(Acemoglu et al., 2001) and Frankel and Romer (Frankel and Romer, 1999). 
most influential factors, so as to run the regression in the context of 11 comparable SSA 
countries. With some notations, the representative equation has the form:   
                                    0 1 2 3
&i i i i iy INS RES H PE          
iy  is the purchasing power parity (PPP) of country i, which measures the local 
purchasing power. The values for the three regressors on the right side of the equation are 
taken as their global rankings in 2009. iINS is the global ranking of country i‟s 
institutional environment, taking legal, public and private institutions into consideration, 
provided by the World Economic Forum 2009. iRES is the value created by natural 
resources in country i, measured by the sum of export value of precious stones, metals, 
mineral fuels and lubricants
9
, whose data are collected from Trade Statistics for 
International Business Development 2008 by the International Trade Center, measured in 
thousand USD
10
. & iH PE  is the health and primary education ranking
11
 given in the 
World Economic Forum Report. I select them as one of the regressors since HIV/AIDS is 
inflicting the entire African continent, significantly reducing the productivity of its labor 
force and primary education is considered vital to the general labor productivity level. 
    Before the presentation of the benchmark result, some comment on the possible 
reverse causality of this model should be made. Work by RST (2002) suggests that their 
model shows a statistically insignificant effect of reverse causality and the data selection 
criteria adopted by FR (1999) and AJR (2001) have excluded, as much as possible, the 
correlation between instrument of institution and other plausible determinants of income 
levels. However, as pointed out by Ashok Chakravarti (Chakravarti 2006, pp.24-26), 
though the reverse causality is negligible in statistical sense, income levels and other 
factors such as resources could have an indirect influence over the quality of institutions. 
I accept the critic of possible reverse causality, but would focus on the larger impact of 
institution on income level rather than the reverse direction since the former is 
statistically significant in our analysis. 
                                                          
9
 It is the log-normalized value that we use in order to match the regression scale. 
10
 International Trade Center (with its sources from UN and local governments), Trade Statistics for 
International Business Development 2008 
11
 In the report, the ranking of the two factors is bundled and a composite index of measurement is used.  
 4. Benchmark Result 
    The regression result (see Appendix C for detail) shows the following characteristic 
equation of regressing PPP (purchasing power parity) on the three principal constituents I 
just identified: 
                  
10.3354 128.6785 6.3083 & 456.9752i i i iy INS RES H PE      
R2=0.536967             (5.0866)             (48.2827)           (18.3675)            (2273.8753) 
    The negative coefficient between institution ranking and PPP shows a statistically 
significant impact of institutional environment on general living standard, indicated by 
PPP, at a 95% confidence level. And this result coincides with the observations made by 
RST (2002). Although highly undesirable institutional environment is prevalent in SSA 
countries, reflected by their generally low rankings in the Global Competitiveness Report 
2009-2010, with a mean of 88.25 (out of 133 countries), countries with relatively higher 
institution status still show their advantage in economic performance over their peers.  
 
5. Interpretation of the Benchmark Result 
5.1 Institutions  
    Although the institution‟s β is relatively smaller than those of the other two principal 
constituents, it is the factor that a country has better control over, which I coin the term 
“tangible endogenous variable”. As the regression result shows a statistically significant 
impact of institutional environment on the economic performance of SSA countries, 
improvements in institutional effectiveness will arguably lead to better economic 
outcomes, thus contributing to poverty reduction. The following analysis first examines 
the evidence of different economic outcomes achieved within different legal systems 
maintained by countries with similar socio-economic backgrounds and then examines the 
evidence of different institutional effectiveness under different administrative & 
legislative frameworks. 
      5.1.1 Legal system 
    Both famous for gold production and with heavy reliance on the agricultural sector, 
Ghana and Tanzania, gaining independence from the British rule at around the same time 
from late 1950s to early 1960s, show a notable difference in economic performance due 
to disparity in institutional environment. Ranked 68 in institution, Ghana has a $200 
surplus of PPP per capita over Tanzania, ranked 74 in 2008.  
    Property right protection, a key factor in determining the desirability of a residential 
real estate investment, constitutes an important pillar in institution analysis. Scored 
50/100 in Global Property Guide
12
, Ghana has a much better defined legal framework 
serving the market mechanism than Tanzania, who scored only 30/100. A more 
comprehensive analysis was done by Timothy Besly from the London School of 
Economics (Besley, 1995), arguing that a well defined land right has a significant impact 
on investment incentives in Ghana. On the other hand, Tanzania is criticized for its lack 
of clear definition of property rights and strong execution of law, especially for 
indigenous people and women. For example, there are three different laws applied to 
inheritance, based on race and religion. For Christians and people of European religions, 
the Statutory Law applies, in which a widow may be entitled to 1/2 of the property of the 
deceased. For Muslims, the Islamic Law applies and a widow is only entitled to up to 1/4 
of the property conditioned on issue of marriage. And sadly for the majority of the 
population, women are not entitled to inheritance at all, according to the Customary 
Law.
13
 Such a complicated and sometimes vague inheritance system is but one example 
of the not well defined legal framework, especially that concerning property rights, in 
Tanzania, which severely hinders its economic activity, especially in the private sector. 
    As proven by practice, a clearly defined and non-discriminatory property right in the 
legal system is the base for market mechanism to be fully functional. A lighter and more 
transparent administrative procedure with regard to transfers of property right is not only 
a matter of good governance but a protection to the right per se. Also, with the rise of 
information technology, the protection of intellectual property right by establishing an 
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 The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal, Global Property Index 
13
 Legal and Human Rights Center, Tanzania Human Rights Report 2008 
efficient enforcement mechanism has become more and more important in the 21
st
 
century. 
      5.1.2 Administration and Legislation 
    According to records by the Africa Research Institute, Tanzania and Senegal are two 
SSA countries that have enjoyed relatively long periods of political stability. Both made 
peaceful transitions from single-party „African socialism‟ to multi-party democracy, 
becoming favorites with foreign donors and development agencies. Recent elections were 
declared free and fair by international observers, but courses of institutional reform in the 
two countries have diverged.
14
 According to the Ibrahim Index of African Governance 
2008
15
, Table 1 compares places moved by the two countries in governing performance 
ranking from 2000 to 2008. 
    During the 1980s and 1990s in Tanzania, party loyalty was demanding. People with 
dissents would be regarded as unpatriotic. Even after the multi-party constitution was 
first enforced in 1992, little had changed. CCM, the majority party, still acted as if 
Tanzania was a one-party state.
16
 However, real changes in the country have been 
recently taking place, including much greater independence of the Parliament. The 
Parliament no longer serves an appendage of the Prime Minister‟s Office. With financial 
independence for the first time, it starts to receive external donations directly. Also, the 
House Standing Orders have been revised in Tanzania to strengthen the oversight role of 
the House. The new Standing Orders introduced the Prime Minister‟s Question and 
Answer Session which takes place every Thursday during Parliamentary Session. Apart 
from testing the Prime Minister‟s ability to respond to impromptu questions, the Q&A 
session, like other parliamentary activities, is televised live, which allows the general 
public to gauge the seriousness of their government in tackling issues of public interest.
17
 
The 2008 Public Audit Act initiated by the Parliament‟s Public Accounts Committee also 
stands to explain how the audit reports are longer, produced on time and taken more 
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 Africa Research Institute, Briefing Note 0901, Oct. 2009  
15
 Rotberg R. and Gisselquist R., 2008, Ibrahim Index of African Governance 2008, Mo Ibrahim Foundation 
16
 Tanzania Affairs Editing Group, Tanzania Affairs, Reviews (online resource) 
17
 Tanzania Corruption Tracker System, New Standing Orders as TZ Parliament Faces Corruption, May 
2009 
seriously by the President.
18
 Such measures have, supported by empirical evidence, 
reduced corruption and increased the autonomy of key oversight bodies so as to develop 
more transparent and effective institutions.  
    In sharp contrast to Tanzania, in Senegal, President Wade and his coalitions have 
amended the Constitutions for 11 times since the beginning of 2007. The amendments 
have arguably weakened the independence of the Parliament.
19
 Of the current 100 seats in 
the Senate, 65 were directly appointed by the President, suggesting an overwhelming 
presidential power in this democratic country. On the administrative side, the 
administrative court of specialized magistrates charged with preparing the annual report 
on public accounts for the Parliament, has not received details of government expenditure 
for 2007 and 2008.
20
 As suggested by the above evidence, the governing party has 
modified to its own advantage the public institutional policies. According to the Africa 
Research Institute, other institutions in Senegal have also been similarly adapted, 
abolished or reinstated, in priorities of the governing party. 
    Although political stability of SSA countries can help attract a significant amount of 
FDI, how to manage such financial resource effectively and fairly stands to be the biggest 
challenge for these countries‟ domestic institutions. The research I did suggests that 
institutional reforms designed to strengthen legislative and supervisory power and 
improve administrative transparency prove to be among the most critical steps to build a 
robust institution. 
 
5.2 Resources 
    Observed from the characteristic equation, the beta for resources is relatively much 
larger than the other two, reflecting the vital role of natural resources in determining SSA 
countries‟ economic progress. It should be noted that although I focus on the endogenous 
variables of significance to a country‟s economic development in this paper, I 
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 National Audit Office of Tanzania, Publications 
19
 Comparative Constitutions Project, Constitutional Events 
20
 Magistrate of the Cour Des Comptes, 2004, “Public Expenditure Management: HIPC Country 
Assessment and Action Plan – Senegal”, IMF/The World Bank 
acknowledge to a large extent the role of exogenous variables specific to a country in the 
development process, which may account for a large portion of the difference in poverty 
reduction among SSA countries, ceteris paribus. 
    Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that endogenous factors, e.g. quality of 
institution, have the potential to make up for resource insufficiency, as in the case of 
Gambia. The log value of Gambia‟s crude resource export is $11.84, mainly consisting of 
groundnuts, much lower than $18.48 in Uganda, a country blessed with substantial 
natural resources including copper, cobalt, oil and natural gas. However, Gambia is one 
of the most liberal, market-oriented economies with a high ranking of institutional 
environment in the world (27/133) while Uganda is ranked only 106/133 in 2009. The 
PPP per capita of Gambia out-performed Uganda by $200 in 2008. Contrary to the mal-
functioning institutions inflicting Uganda, a complete legal system, among other well-
designed institutions, has helped Gambia successfully manage its agriculture-based 
economy, cultivate a mature tourism industry and utilize its ports to develop re-export 
trade basing on its low import duties, minimum administrative costs and liberal exchange 
regime, a combination of which the other west African countries desperately lack. 
 
5.3 Health and Education 
      5.3.1 Health  
    Regression result shows that health and education has a significant influence over 
poverty due to their direct impact on human capital. In this section, I first focus on the 
health issue. Health problems can result in poverty simply because people are in such 
case deprived of productivity to different extents. The relationship between poverty and 
health constitutes a vicious cycle: poor health can cause poverty and poverty can further 
lead to poor health since poor people cannot afford quality medical services, according to 
Grant, 2005. Health statistics in SSA imply that much is to be done to alleviate the 
problem: the under-five mortality rate, the number of woman dead from pregnancy and 
childbirth, and life expectancy, are all much worse than those of the rest of the world.
21
 
As one of the most cited causes of poverty, HIV/AIDS has resulted in high levels of 
mortality, with the number of people dying from AIDS in SSA still increasing (Handley 
et al., 2009). AIDS exacerbates the poverty problem by severely hampering labor 
productivity, which in turn leads to lower income and lower level of security (especially 
food security), thus increasing their vulnerability to other diseases (Harvey, 2004). 
HIV/ADIS can also restrict government budget and public service delivery, further 
undermining the social stability (Handley et al., 2009). To tackle this giant problem, two 
types of policies have been devised in the hope of effective implementation. The first is a 
broad public health response mechanism, which focuses on improving the access and 
quality of primary health care. The other is disease-targeting prevention schemes. 
However, budgetary constraints, inadequate governance and accountability issues have 
greatly undermined the effectiveness of such policies (Bird and Busse, 2006). In order to 
facilitate a better implementation, robust institutions with stronger supervisory guidance 
are necessary.  
      5.3.2 Education  
    Similar to health, education influences poverty reduction heavily through its direct 
effect on human capital accumulation and labor productivity. In this section, I aim to 
answer three main questions: (1) Is there a correlation between education and poverty? (2) 
To what extent can education help with poverty reduction in SSA? (3) What can be done 
to improve education in SSA and hence reduce poverty? 
    When compared to world enrolment rates for primary and secondary school education, 
Africa lags far behind. For example, in 2007, there were 71.8 million primary age 
children in the world who were out of school.
22
 The shocking fact is that almost half of 
these children lived in SSA. In addition, the world average enrolment rate for secondary 
school education in 2007 was 58.8%, whereas in SSA, this figure was just slightly above 
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 United Nations Development Program, UNDP: An Effective and Accountable Development Partner, pp. 
265 
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 Edstats, The State of Education Around the World, The World Bank, last updated Jul. 2009 
25%.
23
 With such concerning statistics, I examine whether this lack of access to quality 
education in SSA contributed to poverty. To proceed, I look at the correlation between 
secondary school enrolment rates and GDP per capita (GDP pc). 
    Table 1 shows the 10 countries with the lowest secondary net enrolment rates, with 
Mozambique having the lowest rate of just 2.55%. All of the countries listed are in SSA, 
with five out of ten being in West Africa. Figure 1 goes one step further to examine the 
relationship between GDP pc and net enrolment rate. It shows that countries with a very 
low GDP pc have net enrolment rates ranging from 2% to 92%, which strongly implies a 
low GDP pc does not necessarily mean a low enrolment rate. This makes logical sense 
because a country with a low GDP pc is still able to invest heavily in education by 
allocating all its resources to improve access to education and hence achieve the outcome 
of a high net enrolment rate. However, the graph also shows us that low secondary net 
enrolment rates are found in countries with low GDP pc. All the countries with net 
enrolment rates less than 25% have a GDP pc of less than 1000 USD. In other words, 
there is a statistically significant positive correlation between education, measured by 
secondary net enrollment rate, and poverty, measured by GDP pc. There are simple 
reasons as to why this relationship exists. First, low secondary enrolment rates indicate a 
loss of benefits that arise from having an educated population for the country, the benefits 
of which are that educated people are more likely to find jobs, generally more productive 
and hence earn more. Second, education gives people relevant skills to become 
entrepreneurs and hence more likely to innovate, which helps stimulate economic growth 
and thereby generate more job opportunities.
24
 According to a study by Hanushek and 
Zhang (2006), “education of good quality promotes economic growth and helps people to 
rise out of poverty”. 
    Having answered the first two questions, I now turn to the question of how can SSA 
countries increase access to education as well as improve its quality. Note that, one 
straightforward reason for low enrolment rates in many SSA countries is the high 
financial costs of schooling, which makes education less affordable to the poor, whose 
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 The World Bank Site-resources, Education and Poverty 
demand are very price elastic. In Kenya, this problem has been overcome by the adoption 
of the Free Primary Education policy in 2003. This policy led to the abolition of primary 
school fee levies charged to parents and had the effect of increasing school enrolment by 
1.2 million children.
25
 Although it is hard to quantify the future economic effects of 
educating an addition of 1.2 million children, this move will without doubt contribute to a 
higher average productivity level in Kenya.
26
 The SSA governments can also improve the 
quality of education by investing in primary school instructional materials. Since many 
schools lack enough books and classrooms, public schools are often overcrowded, where 
quality of education suffers. By investing a bit more in new classrooms and increasing 
the number of educational resources available to students, the quality of education can be 
greatly improved given the originally low level. Improvement of resources available to 
students also includes having training programs for teachers as well as employing more 
teachers at public schools to increase the teacher/student ratio.   
 
6. Residual Variance—Agency Coordination in the Process of Institutional 
Implementation 
    Although the benchmark result shows significant relations between the poverty level, 
measured by PPP, and the three endogenous as well as exogenous factors, countries with 
very similar levels of such constituents may still undergo considerably different 
development process and achieve diverging outcomes. How do we explain for such a 
„residual variance‟ that is unaccounted for by the benchmark model among different SSA 
countries with similar levels of the principal constituents? The answer lies in the actual 
implementation of institutional reforms and liberal policies. 
    In order to invigorate the institutions and liberal policies as suggested in the previous 
sections, a strong and effective implementation mechanism is necessary. Better 
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 UNESCO, 2006, UNESCO Policy Brief on Early Childhood: Impact of Free Primary Education on Early 
Childhood Development in Kenya 
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 Another way to improve education in SSA is by ensuring equity of access to basic education. The 
governments should invest in primary school infrastructure and expand educational opportunities to arid 
and semi-arid lands so that children in these areas can attend school. 
coordination among economic agents to achieve a more desirable outcome as planned 
with higher efficiency is the key to success. In the implementation process, measures 
should be taken to enable different agents to be more aware of their respective roles in the 
domestic socio-economic environment, so as to pave way to more effective and efficient 
institutional reforms. In addition, information dissemination is often neglected as one of 
the critical elements in enhancing communications and thus agency coordination. 
Therefore, to provide a better decision-making environment for all agents, it should be 
taken seriously to increase the domestic information availability and improve the 
asymmetric information problems through mitigating communication barriers. In the 
following, I will focus on the three primary domestic socio-economic agents in the SSA 
countries, namely, farmers, firms and governments, to analyze respective issues 
concerning a satisfactory institutional implementation. 
 
 
6.1 Small scale farmers: Agricultural information dissemination     
    Being information-dependent in nature, agriculture in SSA faces huge challenges with 
limited access to information and innovations. Dissemination of basic agricultural 
information such as pest control, soil fertility, farm credit, etc. are much impeded, which 
in turn blocks the delivery of agriculture financing resources and related technologies. To 
small scale farms which contribute an enormous proportion of agricultural production in 
SSA countries, demands for institutionalized information have never been sufficiently 
accommodated, having farmers often fettered in attempt to higher productivity (Ozowa, 
1997). 
    Despite the much difficulty, the information dissemination problem can be tackled 
with good agency coordination from different spheres and levels, as in the case of Nigeria, 
which can serve as a functioning example for other SSA countries to address their own 
problems in the agricultural sector. In Nigeria, where over 94% of all farms are classified 
as small, agricultural market information to small scale farmers is provided by the 
Ministry of Agriculture, in cooperation with local institutes, such as International 
Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA), the National Root Crops Research Institute, the 
National Veterinary Research Institute, and the three local universities of agriculture. 
Information is then disseminated through extension workers and broadcasting media, e.g. 
the Agricultural Extension and Research Liaison Services (AERLS), the extension 
services of the Agricultural Development Project (ADPs), Ministries of Agriculture at 
both state and federal levels, Cooperative Extension Centers (CEC), and various media 
forums for agricultural issues. Such information is also diffused through public and 
private leaflets, newsletters, posters, exhibits and state-owned radio and television 
programs. Teachers, development field staff, entrepreneurs and staff of the Ministry of 
Agriculture also actively participate in the campaign. Such concerted efforts, gathered 
from different social layers, and spread nationwide in good coordination, have helped the 
country greatly in increasing its agricultural productivity as well as the gross production. 
 
 
6.2 Micro, small and medium sized firms: Private mass media involvement 
    Production of firms is of central economic importance to a country‟s development, but 
here, rather than discussing the conventional issue of goods and markets, I want to 
address a more inducing issue related to the private business sector that can positively 
influence the institutional implementation of liberal policies—the private mass media 
involvement. In most SSA countries, the deregulation of media catalyzed a boom of 
private radios to accommodate the needs of information exchange for micro, small and 
medium sized entrepreneurs (MSEs). Highlighting policy issues concerning daily 
entrepreneurial operations, the burgeoning radio stations targeting a large scale of MSEs 
offer investigative reports, phone-ins, interviews and public debates in two-way flow of 
information. Many of these commercial media collaborate with the International Labor 
Organization (ILO)'s Focus Program on Boosting Employment through Small Enterprise 
Development (SED) to enhance information provision and technical viability.
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    A brilliant example of how independent media help forge better understanding and 
execution of development policies is Nekolera Gyange, a private media firm in Luganda, 
Central Uganda. It serves as a channel for marginalized business people, especially the 
self-employed, to voice out their concerns and harbor their interests. In 2000, Nekolera 
Gyange successfully reversed a government ban on small-scale milk vending and saved 
thousands of jobs. It also facilitated through its radio programs the implementation of 
government policies in the issue of enforcing fishing regulations on Lake Victoria. 
Originally perceived as an inflicting government move to the suffering fishing industry, 
the policy was later construed when officials and fishermen shared the platform offered 
by Nekolera Gynage to present their explanations and propose solutions. In the Ugandan 
story, both the government and the MSEs managed to coordinate well with the help of 
private media to achieve greater economic benefits and social development. 
 
 
6.3 The Role of Government 
    In the discussion of institutional reforms and policies implementation, the role of 
government is always an issue of continuous debate. Some claim that Statism, which 
supports strong government involvement in engineering economic growth, is the 
dominant solution to a thorough execution of development policies and institutional 
reforms, while some others argue that the self-regulating market mechanism is intelligent 
in coordinating conflicting interests and can achieve an effective and efficient 
implementation of institutions and policies without over-disruptions from the government. 
Noting such arguments in the academia as well as in the real policy arena, it should be 
pointed out that this paper does not posit any stance towards either of these directions. 
The role of government has been always hard to define and continuously ambiguous in 
different contexts. To preserve the focus of my research, I try not to touch ground the 
debate of „market or state‟, but rather restate and emphasize the analytic locus of control 
in this paper: decomposition of economic performance of SSA countries in search for 
principal factors that determine the poverty reduction progress made by these countries. 
Although I stress the importance of institutional implementation and emphasize the 
mutual dependence of domestic institutions and government, I reserve my view on the 
absolute positioning of government and adopt a contextual approach to perform the 
analysis, concluding with a contingent treatment of government involvements in the 
process of institutional implementation. It should also be noted that the actual 
implementations evidenced in different SSA countries are arguably a product of complex 
interactions of the interests of various parties, including the SSA governments, the donors 
of those IOs and NGOs, and the indigenous people, which makes the implementation 
issue at this level another grand topic for further research. 
 
7. Conclusion 
    This paper started by asking a simple but deep question of how can we improve the 
poverty situation in Africa, especially in the SSA countries, and proceeded to construct a 
benchmark regression model, base on which the three principal constituents of economic 
development in SSA are identified and discussed. The implication of the benchmark 
result is simple in that it indicates institutions play a significant role in poverty reduction 
in the SSA region, so do health care and education, with natural resources an exogenous 
factor that a country has no control of. However, the implications have also drawn 
attention to the more subtle but fundamental issue that complicates the poverty reduction 
progress in SSA—the actual implementation of institutions and policies, in which I 
highlight three primary actors in a country‟s socio-economic development and propose a 
possible solution to the agency problem through social coordination and information 
dissemination. Although individual countries have their own set of determinants of 
poverty reduction, the methodology proposed is believed to serve as a good tool for 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation, comparison and implication. Problems are tackled 
step by step, and I do not intend to address the poverty reduction issue in SSA completely 
within a single paper. Some issues such as the role of government in the process of 
institutional implementation are left for further research to produce a clearer vision on the 
matters. However, the basic intuition remains: at the pragmatic level of poverty reduction, 
policy is of the dominant concern, and the implementation in essence is a contingent 
strategy formed upon the domestic context of a specific country. The basic logic goes that 
as long as a principal component to poverty reduction is statistically significantly 
identified, agents in the economy should increase their awareness and direct their 
interactions towards the consideration of any feasible policies corresponding to the 
principal component so that the relation implied by the benchmark model can be fully 
utilized. 
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Appendix A: The Case of Tanzania 
    After the positive and normative analyses in the previous sections, we may wonder 
whether this principal constituents decomposition applies to a real world SSA country 
and whether it is time consistent. Here, let us consider a case study of the economic 
performance of Tanzania in the past thirty years to illustrate the implications drawn 
from the benchmark model. One thing should to be clarified is that good institution is 
not exclusively reserved for capitalism. However, historical evidence shows that due 
to agency problems, conflicting interests in different levels make it much harder for 
countries under Socialism to maintain a good institution thus perform not as good in 
poverty reduction as under Capitalism, at least well proven by the modern history of 
economic development in most nation-states after WWII. 
    Tanzania had been a classic example of African Socialism since the 1960s. 
However, years of implementation of socialist policy under poor governance due to 
insufficient institutional supervision have made the country among the most aid-
dependent and least developed in the world. Its highly inefficient collective farms and 
notorious forced relocations have not only discouraged labor productivity but 
undermined its institutions, especially the legal framework, as central planning 
demands subjective resource allocation and even arbitrary confiscation of property 
which is deemed illegal under property right protection enforcement. With the demise 
of the Soviet Union and the failed economic model it represented, Tanzania 
contemplated on a critical institutional reform in the mid 1980s. Privatization and 
gradual institutional reforms in various sectors including banking and governance 
have vitalized the country's economy, effectively reducing its poverty rate measured 
by the UN standard by 28% between 1994 and 2002 according to a World Bank 
research. In the case of Tanzania, institutional reforms, especially improvements in 
the legal system and administration and legislation, have been vital to the poverty 
reduction progress the country has achieved. Although institutional reforms and 
liberal policies can and has indeed brought positive changes in SSA countries, we 
should acknowledge the fact that improvement of domestic institutions is not the only 
and ultimate cure for the problem of poverty in the region. Other factors that have 
contributed to poverty in SSA are deeply embedded in those countries, and are not 
likely to change much in the near future.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Tables and Figures 
Table 1 
 GDP (% 
Growth per 
capita) 
Human 
Rights 
Judicial 
Independence 
Decline in 
public 
corruption 
Tanzania -17 +24 +10 +12 
Senegal -20 +6 -19 +8 
 
Table 2 
10 Countries with the Lowest Secondary Net Enrollment Rates (2007) 
1  Mozambique  2.55 
2   Niger  9.01 
3   Burkina Faso 12.40 
4   Mauritania  16.77 
5   Uganda  18.89 
6   Madagascar  21.19 
7   Senegal  22.21 
8   Sierra Leone 22.82 
9   Malawi  23.91 
10   Lesotho  23.94 
Source:  UNESCO Institute for Statistics in EdStats, Aug 2009 
Notes:  Lesotho figure is for 2006.  Data was not available for 86 countries. 
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